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The most important fact about persons is that they 
are conscious, but contemporary philosophers, who ignore 
Wittgenstein’s work in this area, present incredibly 
distorted views of consciousness. The central principle of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is that meaning is use. The 
word “consciousness”, like “awareness”, is used ordinarily 
more-or-less synonymously with “experiencing” and with 
“knowing”, but in a much narrower range of situations (e.g. 
when someone is coming out of a faint). “Consciousness” 
does not denote anything ontologically real; instead, it has 
uses. Philosophers extend the sense of the word to include 
all experience or our entire mental life. Even then, there is 
no mystery about consciousness. There are neural 
preconditions for consciousness, but these are to be 
investigated by the scientist, not the philosopher. It is 
absurd to identify consciousness with the neural 
preconditions; the concept is not used like that. When one 
sees a flower, one can be said in the extended 
philosophical sense of conscious, to be conscious of it. But 
while one can be conscious of a flower, there is no such 
thing as being conscious of the seeing, in the sense of 
experiencing the seeing. If one tries to be conscious of 
seeing the flower, one does not find anything while the 
attention one gives to the flower diminishes markedly. 
Seeing, like being conscious and being aware and 
experiencing, is always of something; the word does not 
denote anything in its own right; it is relational, like 
“consciousness”. Moreover, the flower one sees is the real 
flower, not a representation of it in the mind. How does one 
see a representation in the mind of a flower? 
Consciousness can also mean knowing and when one 
sees a flower, one can be said to know one is seeing it, but 
here again, the use is relational; one cannot say anything 
about knowing, about being conscious in this sense, in 
their own right. Moreover, this use of “know” or “conscious” 
is innovative; these words are normally used when it 
makes sense to doubt, to talk of not knowing etc., but here 
it makes no sense to do this.  
It already shows confusion to ask what 
consciousness is; if one knows how to use the word, there 
is nothing more to discover. When philosophers try to 
discover what consciousness is, they get nowhere. As an 
example, let us take the work of Norton Nelkin (Nelkin 
1996).  
Nelkin believes that there are three disparate 
states, each of which he calls consciousness- CS states, 
or sensation consciousness, C1 states, or proposition-like 
consciousness and C2 states, or apperceptive 
consciousness, which is consciousness of some CS or C1 
states. Nelkin calls CS and C1 states states of 
consciousness because one is aware in these states 
although not apperceptively aware. In CS states, one can 
feel tingles, experiences colours and hears sounds without 
knowing that one is doing so. To know that one is feeling 
tingles, an act of apperceptive consciousness is 
necessary; one would have to be C2 aware of the CS 
state; one would have to be aware of the feeling. In C1 
states, one can work on a philosophical problem or drive a 
car safely through traffic obstacles without knowing that 
one is doing so; for that, there has to be C2 awareness of 
the C1 states; one has to be aware of the thinking or the 
driving. Apperceptive consciousness is not necessary for 
thinking or driving. If we are usually aware of our 
experiences, it is because we are usually C2 conscious. 
To give another example: if a man runs approaches us 
with a knife, a baby and an adult would experience the 
same sensation (a CS state) but the adult would also have 
an experience of meaning; he would see a man 
approaching with a knife (a C1 state). But to know that he 
is seeing a man approaching with a knife, a C2 state would 
be needed.    
These extravagant claims about human nature are 
actually incoherent. There can be no such thing as feeling 
a tingle and not knowing that one is doing so. In fact, it 
does not even make sense in such situations to doubt, 
whereas we use “know” in situations where it makes sense 
to doubt. “I feel a tingle but I do not know it” does not make 
sense. If someone is not aware of feeling tingles, we 
cannot say that he is feeling tingles and similarly for 
experiencing colours, hearing sounds, seeing a man 
approaching with a knife and so on. Nelkin separates 
experiencing colours, for example, from being aware of 
experiencing colours, and maintains that the first can exist 
without the second, but there is no second state, only a 
tautological possibility of talking about being aware of or 
knowing that one is experiencing colours when one is 
experiencing colours, and the “being aware” or “knowing” 
is being used innovatively, because here doubt makes no 
sense. Apperceptive consciousness is an illusion, born of 
an idle and innovative tautology. Actually, this is the old 
view of consciousness as an extra something bestowing 
luminosity upon mental states. But consciousness is not an 
extra something; to be conscious of a flower is just to see 
the flower, with the word being used in special 
circumstances. 
Nelkin tries to support his case with empirical 
arguments. Regarding CS states, he suggests the 
following experiment. If one concentrates on the soles of 
one’s feet, one experiences certain phenomena. When 
one shifts one’s attention to the pit of one’s stomach, one 
experiences certain other phenomena.  When one returns 
one’s attention to the soles of one’s feet, the original 
phenomena are once again experienced. This is an 
instance of one’s discovering phenomena that were 
experienced all along, of one’s discovering that the 
feelings continued, although they were not apperceived. It 
seems as if one discovered phenomena that were being 
experienced all along, although they were not apperceived; 
the phenomena seem to be still there. Or if one is asked if 
one still has a headache, one may move one’s head about 
and seem to discover the feeling there and say that one 
still has it. Or, at a cocktail party, when one does not 
apperceptively hear anything until a key word or topic of 
interest occurs, it seems as if one is tapping into a 
phenomenal flow that was already there. Or one might, 
when concentrating upon something else, find oneself 
scratching one’s arm. This is surely done to rid oneself of a 
phenomenal feeling, an itch. Nelkin argues that the feeling 
of discovery is natural and justified if phenomenal states 
can exist dissociated from apperception. 
Feelings, experiences and phenomena (as Nelkin 
uses this word) are processes that are manifested to us, or 
explicit processes. If feelings were there all along, one 
cannot discover them because one can only discover what 
one is not aware of, what is not already explicit. If one 




discovers that a process existed, then it must have been 
something that one was not aware of till then, and 
therefore not a feeling or an experience or a phenomenon. 
It could be the pressure of the ground on one’s feet, the 
headache, the conversational flow, or the itch. Regarding 
the headache, although one would say that one still has 
the headache, one would not say that one felt it all along. 
One cannot “tap into” the phenomenal flow, although one 
can tap into a conversational flow to which one was not 
attending till then. One can only “tap into” what is hidden 
from oneself, not into what is already manifested to 
oneself. The itch Nelkin mentions is a very common 
occurrence but it is a case of the body reacting without 
one’s being conscious of it; again there is no feeling. All 
these are states that one is not conscious of but could 
become conscious of if one wanted. Perhaps Nelkin is 
unconsciously making a linguistic recommendation; he 
wants to call these unconscious states feelings, 
experiences and phenomena. Nelkin thinks that future 
empirical research will decide the issue one way or the 
other but the demand made upon empirical research would 
be self-contradictory; how can empirical research prove 
that what is manifested to oneself is not manifested to 
oneself? If something is already manifested to oneself, it 
will always make sense to say that one knows it. Is 
someone feels a tingle, it will always make sense to say he 
is aware of it.  
Nelkin makes similar claims about C1 states. He 
thinks, for example, that it is possible to think without being 
“apperceptively conscious”, that is, unconsciously. He 
gives the example of working on a problem, getting stuck 
and leaving it for a while, to find a well-formed solution 
coming to oneself. This suggests that a reasoning process 
took place without one’s knowing it. Another example is 
that of driving while thinking deeply about a problem. One 
reaches one’s destination safely but is unable to remember 
the traffic obstacles one must have negotiated 
successfully.  This suggests that one saw them, although 
one did not know it. But there is no such thing as an 
argument appearing unsatisfactory to us, rejecting it and 
putting a better one in its place and not knowing that we 
are doing so. There is no such as seeing a red traffic light 
and stopping without knowing that there is a red traffic light 
and that one is stopping or swerving to avoid a car and not 
knowing that one is swerving to avoid a car. Since these 
are explicit processes, it does not make sense to say that 
one does not know that they are there. The well-formed 
solution can be explained in terms of the previous 
grappling with the problem and the inability to remember 
the traffic obstacles is just an inability to remember. 
Nelkin makes use of experiments involving 
pathological cases (blindsight, commissurotomy cases 
etc.) to support his suggestion that C1 states can exist 
without C2 states. He cites, for example, the case of 
blindsight patients who, when presented with shapes like 
an X or an O in their blind areas, consistently denied 
seeing anything. But when asked to guess what the shape 
of the object is, they nearly always succeeded in guessing 
correctly. This shows, according to Nelkin, that they were 
in a C1 state (had an experience of meaning or 
intentionality, saw objects under an aspect) without being 
aware (or apperceptively aware, in his phraseology) of it. 
Since the conception of a C1 state is incoherent, there can 
be no confirming evidence for it, any more than for a round 
square. The patients’ denials show that there was no 
experience, and their behaviour that there was experience; 
there is no such thing as proving that unconscious 
experience exists. These are cases of reports and 
behaviour not matching. The patients, who suffered from 
abnormalities, may have misused language, or the 
experiments may have lacked proper controls. Nelkin 
suggests that although the patients experienced no visual 
phenomena, a purely physical process, starting at the 
retina and continuing into the brain, and involving 
processing there, caused the patients to give the correct 
answers. This means that the process was unconscious. 
There was no visual experience, no seeing. And if the 
patients were caused to give the correct answers, they 
were not conscious then; they were automata. If they were 
conscious, they would act for reasons, not mechanically.  
The above argument is a part of Nelkin’s 
thoroughgoing physicalist internalism where 
consciousness is concerned. Take the case of one’s 
seeing the clock on Parliament Tower. Nelkin would say 
that there is first a sensory “scanning” of the clock. This 
results in an unaspectualized (i.e. lacking in intentionality 
or meaning) internal representation, a CS state, a neural 
pattern, which is further “scanned” and “weighed”, resulting 
in an aspectualized representation, a C1 state, another 
neural pattern, which we call a perception. By now, there is 
intentionality or meaning but one does not know it; if asked 
if one is seeing the clock, one would deny it, like Nelkin’s 
patients. This aspectualized representational state causes 
an apperceptive representation having the content “I am 
seeing the clock” to emerge. This information is 
“broadcast” to other modules, causing the person, for 
example, to utter an appropriate English sentence.    Since 
Nelkin does not give us the actual mechanisms (e.g. how 
exactly the apperceptive state is produced) his 
suggestions are empty. Since he does not say what a 
disconfirming instance would be, his theory is 
metaphysical and not scientific. “Scanning”, “weighing” and 
“broadcasting” involve rational processing which is 
possible, as a matter of grammar, only for conscious 
creatures (the homuncular fallacy) or, in a different sense 
of rational processing, for machines designed by 
conscious creatures. Elsewhere Nelkin uses expressions 
like “computing data”, “inferring”, “encoding” and “recoding” 
in connection with processes in the brain and the same 
objection holds. Nelkin even maintains that apperception 
has a language. The inference is unavoidable because 
there can be no rational processing without language, but 
again this implies the presence of a language-user. If 
sections of the brain were capable of rational processing, 
could act for reasons, could use language, we would have 
to say that they were conscious creatures or machines 
designed by conscious creatures. Nelkin thinks that 
advances in computer technology will help us to 
understand how parts of the brain could function in this 
way, but very sophisticated human beings will design 
those computers. Nature is driven by causes, not reasons; 
Nelkin has overlooked the Wittgensteinian distinction 
between the two. Actually, Nelkin’s theory implies that 
persons are not conscious, for consciousness in the 
everyday sense is of external things, not of brain states. 
Again, if persons are caused to do things by modules, they 
are automatons, and not conscious. On the other hand, 
homunculi inside their heads are conscious! 
Clearly, Nelkin has misunderstood consciousness. 
Philosophers like Paul Churchland, David Rosenthal and 
Fred Dretske are equally vulnerable to a critique from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective when they discuss 
consciousness, as also Robert M. Gordon, when he takes 
up the related subject of emotions. Philosophers should 
return to the principles of Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
psychology.   
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